The Kurds, the Four Wolves and the Great Powers by O'Leary, Brendan
The Kurds, the Four Wolves and the Great Powers
O'Leary, B. (2017). The Kurds, the Four Wolves and the Great Powers. Journal of Politics, 1-14. DOI:
10.1086/695343
Published in:
Journal of Politics
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
Copyright 2017 by the Southern Political Science Association.This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies.
Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:04. Jan. 2018
R E V I E W E S S A Y
The Kurds, the Four Wolves, and the Great Powers
Brendan O’Leary, University of Pennsylvania
The Kurds of Syria. By Harriet Allsopp. London: Tauris, 2015.
The Kurds of Iraq: Nationalism and Identity in Iraqi Kurdi-
stan. ByMahir A. Aziz. 2nd ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan,
2015.
Out of Nowhere: The Kurds of Syria in Peace and War.
By Michael M. Gunter. London: Hurst, 2014.
The Kurds: A Modern History. By Michael M. Gunter.
Princeton, NJ: Wiener, 2016.
Alien Rule. By Michael Hechter. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2013.
Political Violence and Kurds in Turkey. By Mehmet Orhan.
London: Routledge, 2015.
Kurds and the State in Iran: The Making of Kurdish Identity.
By Abbas Vali. London: Tauris, 2014.
For centuries, the stereotype of a bandit nation attachedto Kurds in both Western and Muslim travel literature.Deemed incurably tribal, they were described as scarcely
civilized people who wore lightly the embrace of scriptural-
ist Islam, preferring Suﬁs and saints to rigorous puritanism.
Predatory nomadic clans who dominated the slopes of the
Zagros and plundered the plains beneath, they allegedly had
no common language, or classical literature, and certainly
no national solidarity; their warriors, brigands not guerrillas,
were for sale, not for self-determination.1 Nuri al-Said, the
primeminister of Hashemite Iraq, infamously once explained
how he intended to address a Kurdish rebellion—with gold.
He paid off one tribe in order to check another in the van-
guard of revolt, the Barzanis. Kurdish nationalist rebellions
against Turkish, Persian, and Arab governments were fre-
quently portrayed as looting expeditions. Ethnographers and
historians, not just twentieth-century Turkish, Iranian, and
Syrian governments, have denied that the Kurds constituted a
singular nation, or possess any national consciousness.2
Today the emergent stereotypes in Western travelogues
and blogs are very different. The Kurds are no longer peri-
odically reviewed in National Geographic as a turbulently ex-
otic premodern people. Michael Gunter, the doyen of Kurd-
ish political studies in the United States, reports that both the
New York Times and National Geographic have put the Kur-
distan Region of Iraq high up in their “must-see” lists (2014,
53). Most recently, the Kurds have been hailed as an endan-
gered species, democrats in the Middle East, and their male
and female soldiers portrayed as plucky ﬁghters for Western
values (see, e.g., Shea 2016). The looting brigands of old have
become today’s progressive pluralists, secular moderns, and
feminist cosmopolitans, certainly by comparison with their
neighbors. Down from the mountains they are hailed as the
denizens of one of the oldest continuously inhabited cities in
the world (Schultz 2014), their women recognized as more ed-
ucated than their Arab counterparts, with their bright dresses
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1. According to a long-forgotten scholarly authority, the Kurds are the “unsubdued scourge of the people of the plains” and divided into tribes and clans,
“like those of medieval Scotland”—not disguised praise. No other race “had developed the marauding instinct to a higher degree than the warlike Kurd
tribes” (Huntington 1909, 142). These descriptions, perhaps, are not too far from Abbas Vali’s account of the Kurds of Iran in the constitutional era (1905–
7), among whom a national consciousness “did not exist”; the community displayed “striking political immaturity” and expressed its “glaring political
backwardness and cultural isolation” (5, 116).
2. The latest edition of a noted British history of Iraq refers to “the Kurdish peoples” (Tripp 2007, 34). Detailed accounts of the diversity—and unity—of
Kurds may be found in Izady (1992) and van Bruinessen (2000).
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and uncovered heads forming a warm contrast to those who
endure Salaﬁst fashions.
Stereotypes should never be relied on, not least because
they often reﬂect the bigotry of those who deploy them, in-
cluding imperial usurpers. But group stereotypes are rarely
entirely baseless. Even the author of The Nature of Prejudice
accepted that stereotypes may contain a kernel of truth (All-
port 1954, 195). In 1906 the average male Kurd likely had
more martial skills and less primary and secondary educa-
tion than the average Chaldean Christian, and in 2016 it is a
good bet that Kurds are far more pro-Western in values and
in their preferred political alliances than their larger neigh-
bors (Arabs, Turks, and Persians).3 Seismic shifts in stereo-
types signal important changes in intergroup relations, and a
complete turnover in the stereotypes of an entire people over
a century certainly warrants scrutiny.
The seven books surveyed here, except Hechter’s, are fo-
cused on today’s Kurds—three are revised doctoral theses
(Allsopp, Aziz, and Orhan), and three are from two senior
scholars (Gunter and Vali); they conﬁrm that the changes re-
ﬂect major endogenous transformations in the lives of Kurds,
not just changes in how outsiders read (and use and abuse)
them. The books are written by Kurds (Aziz, Vali), an author
born in a village with a high proportion of Kurds but whose
name does not tell his ethnicity (Orhan), and two Anglophone
non-Kurds (Allsopp and Gunter), whereas Hechter, an inter-
nationally distinguished US sociologist, is best known for his
insightful but varied trajectory on the interpretation of nation-
alism—he has been in the vanguard of both neo-Marxist and
rational-choice understandings of nationalist mobilization.
These books, individually and jointly, provide readers with an
opportunity to see both the distinct and the interconnected
trajectories of Kurds in the four polities in which they are
mostly concentrated and an opportunity to appraise the
prospects of their respective nationalisms on the eve of a
referendum that may usher in an independent state that may
be called the Republic of Kurdistan or South Kurdistan.
Gunter has briskly condensed his three decades of schol-
arly engagement into a précis that can safely be put into the
hands of both the student and the diplomat.4 He conﬁrms how
slow the US State Department, under both the Bush and the
Obama administrations, has been to shift its stereotyped dis-
positions toward Kurds and Kurdistan(s). When the United
States became what the French call a hyperpower, the State
Department developed the doctrine that the territorial integ-
rity of every state that existed in 1948, and their postcolonial
successors, should be protected with the full repertoire of US
diplomatic and hard power. Corollaries of this doctrine in-
clude the dogma that failed, fragmented, and destroyed states
must be put back together, regardless of cost. Even if the Pen-
tagon smashed the relevant state to pieces, US diplomats—
and contractors—should glue together the shards and apply
the well-established science of postconﬂict reconstruction. In
this worldview, only mildly stereotyped here, Kurds remain
unruly challengers to global order, even if no longer nomadic
brigands. Whatever the long-term impact of ISIS on US pol-
icy may be, it has forced the begrudging recognition within
the State Department that there are much worse challengers
to planetary stability among the Kurds’s neighbors and that
defeating them requires alliances with Kurds—good Kurds
and even bad Kurds.
Truly shifting State Department shibboleths regarding
Kurdishmatters will not be easy, however. After the fall of the
shah, US policy makers decided that propping up a strong
government in Baghdad was necessary to balance the novel
and aggressive theocracy being constructed in Tehran. This
response underpinned the subsequent “dual containment” of
Iraq and Iran. The belief that a strong government in Bagh-
dad was good for the United States—as well as for Iraqis—
stubbornly survived the decisions by the two Presidents Bush
to destroy Baghdad’s conventional armed forces in 1991 and
2003.5 The dogma was, however, slightly amended after the
removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The emendation pro-
claimed that what was needed was a strongly centralized fed-
eral government—in which all would be “just Iraqis.”6 An
equally deluded conviction was that a democratic and recen-
tralized Iraq would be anti-Iranian. Quite why this would
happen was never convincingly explained, even though it was
obvious that the Shia constituted both a demographic and
electoral majority and that their religious parties were going
to be electorally popular. It seems to have been assumed that
their pan-Iraqi identity would be paramount over their Shiite
Iraqi identity. To these wishful thoughts was added another:
the Kurds would consent to recentralization. Today the “One
Iraq” policy of the State Department may be on its last legs,
shredded of credibility.
3. This judgment may be inferred from the Pew Research Center
(2014, 13–25).
4. Gunter’s The Kurds: A Modern History is crisper and more up to
date than the book that has deservedly held the ﬁeld since it was ﬁrst
published in 1996 (i.e., McDowall 2004). Gunter’s select bibliography and
documentation are better. The best current political science introduction
to Kurdish questions is found in Romano (2006).
5. This is not the place to review the merits of either Gulf War, but
Aziz and Gunter suggest that the ﬁrst led to the betrayal of both Kurdish
and Shiite expectations of US support and thereby damaged the later pros-
pects of US success in regime replacement.
6. The Baker-Hamilton recommendations would have recentralized
Iraq (and repealed all the constitutional gains made by Kurds) and yet
were self-described as “new.” See O’Leary (2007b).
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The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patri-
otic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) negotiated the Constitution
of Iraq to achieve a multinational and extensively decentral-
ized federation—and believed that they had succeeded in
doing so under the mediation of the one recent US ambas-
sador with a Middle East formation, Zalmay Khalilzad. Sub-
sequent US ambassadors, however, discouraged Kurds from
allegedly “overreaching,” that is, admonished them not to
exercise their rights ratiﬁed by the constitution of 2005—es-
pecially their rights to have their own security forces, oil and
gas exploration, and licensing and export rights and to rectify
the region’s southern border through plebiscites and the un-
winding of Baathist settler colonial programs.7 Had the KDP
and the PUK listened to US security advice, and the con-
stitutional counsel of the State Department, the KRG would
have been governed by ISIS after 2014.
The member states of the European Union (EU) updated
their perspectives almost as slowly as the US State Depart-
ment. Most ﬁrst began to think signiﬁcantly about Kurds and
Kurdistan in the early 1990s—after Gulf War 1; the failed
Kurdish rebellion against Saddam Hussein; mass-refugee
ﬂight into Turkey and Iran; the establishment of a safe haven
in what was delicately disguised as “northern Iraq”; and the
subsequent emergence of a de facto autonomous Kurdistan,
triggered by Saddam Hussein withdrawal of Iraqi revenues
and services in an effort to starve the Kurds into submission.
European foreign ofﬁces began more serious reﬂection when
Turkey was promoted to the status of a candidate member of
the EU in 1999. The monitoring of human and minority rights
then became both a condition for determining Turkey’s ac-
cession and a means to block it. But it also emerged that the
southeastern border of the EUmight in the future pass through
historic Kurdistan. Today Kurdish questions are part of refu-
gee questions.8
THE FOUR WOLVES AND KURDISH QUESTION(S)
All the authors treat Kurdish politics within each of the four
major polities that Kurdish nationalists call the “four wolves,”
namely, Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran.9 Two of the wolves,
typically described as vicious in the same stereotype, are now
deeply lamed, namely, Iraq and Syria. The Baathist Iraqi wolf
would be certiﬁed as dead had it not morphed into the ISIS
werewolf—the so-called Islamic State is the latest and most
explosive cocktail of Baathism and political Sunni Islam, now
joined with many of the Sunni Arabs of Syria (see esp. Cock-
burn 2015). By contrast, the two big wolves, Turkey and Iran,
are not lame. Kurdish nationalists usually caricature Turkey
as powerful and dangerous but predictable, less politely nam-
ing it the clumsiest, thickest, andmost rigid of the four wolves.
After all, Turkish governments spent decades calling the
Kurds “Mountain Turks,” even though no tour guides ever
reported that Turkish-speaking hikers in the Zagros suddenly
lost their ﬂuency in the mother of all languages.10 Completing
the typology of wolves is themost cunning, manipulative, and
unscrupulous, Iran. Evidence for the Iranian regime’s Ma-
chiavellian skills is its current control of its Kurds: Gunter
(2016) describes their status in a chapter subtitled “Tempo-
rarilyQuiescent?”—and that succinctly conveys his argument.
Vali writes similarly that “the Kurdish question in Iran [is] no
longer an expression of discontent by a minority on the cul-
tural periphery of Iranian politics, but [is] rather its silent
center, constantly pulsating, questioning the political unity
and ethnic identity of the sovereign power” (136). For him,
the Kurds linguistic and ethnic identity prove that Iran’s claim
to be a nationally uniﬁed republic is fraudulent.
All the authors are likely correct to suggest that there are
four distinct Lesser Kurdistan questions rather than just one
Greater Kurdistan question. In his survey of Kurdish students
in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Aziz, for example, reports
that while 90% favored the independence of the region from
Iraq, less than 2% also favored joining upwith “the other three
parts of Kurdistan” (table 8.6., 135).11 Important qualiﬁca-
tions, however, are required to the thought that there is no
7. Article 121 (5) of the Constitution of 2005 granted regions the right
to have their own police, security forces, and guards; Article 110 excluded
the federal government from having any exclusive powers over oil and gas
ownership, management, and exploitation (compare it with the Transi-
tional Administrative Law’s Article 25); Article 111 assigned ownership of
oil and gas to all the people in all the regions and governorates (not the
federal government); and Articles 115 and 121 (2) provided for regional
legal supremacy on all matters outside of the exclusive powers of the federal
government, which did not include any powers over oil and gas or the exporting
of goods and services (Iraqi Council of Representatives, Iraqi Constitution,
http://www.parliament.iq). See also Gailbraith (2006, 191ff.), McGarry and
O’Leary (2007), and O’Leary (2007a).
8. General Philip M. Breedlove, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe, told the House Armed Services Committee of the US Congress in
February 2016 that “Russia and the Assad regime are deliberately weap-
onizing migration from Syria in an attempt to overwhelm European struc-
tures and break European resolve” (Ferdinando 2016). He did not remark
on the Kurdish presence among the refugees; the Turkish government’s use
of mass ﬂight as leverage against EU and US positions (which, by contrast
with Ankara’s, prioritize the defeat of ISIS over the removal of the Assad
regime); or the EU’s desperation to pay Turkey to warehouse as many ref-
ugees as possible, pending the (promised) restabilizations of Iraq and Syria,
even if that breaks international law.
9. There were Kurds in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Caucasus Re-
publics in the Soviet Federation (see Müller 2000), and some remain within
the Russian Federation where “Kurdology” may well still be stronger than
anywhere else.
10. For scholarly analysis and light relief on Turkish language policies,
see Lewis (1999).
11. The survey dates back to 2007.
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Greater Kurdistan question: organizational, sentimental, and
policy oriented.
The Kurdistan Workers Party, the Partîya Karkerên Kur-
distan (PKK), is organized in a pan-nationalist mode, even
though it has abandoned the goal of an independent Greater
Kurdistan. Among its numerous front organizations, the Dem-
ocratic Union Party, the Partîya Yekîtî ya Dêmokrat (PYD), is
the PKK’s franchise operation in Syria, while the Free [Inde-
pendent] Life Party of Kurdistan, the Partîya Jiyani Azadi
Kurdistan (PJAK), is its equivalent in Iran. The PKK has no
signiﬁcant front organization within Iraq, but it has bases in
the Qandil mountains, from which it periodically launches
attacks into Turkey and in which it is periodically struck by
Turkish armed forces. The KRG opposes the use of violence
by the PKK against Turkey, and vice versa,12 but it does not
have the resources to shut off the passage ofmilitants in either
direction—the formidable terrain still matters. Not only is
the PKK organized in a pan-Kurdish fashion, but it has of-
ten sought to achieve monopolistic control over other Kurd-
ish parties and organizations, and with extreme violence, as
Orhan documents. The PKK has fought both the KDP and
the PUK, particularly the former, usually whenever the two
parties seem vulnerable. The KDP in the KRGwas itself once
organized in pan-Kurdish fashion. There were and are KDPs
in Syria (exhaustively treated by Allsopp), in Turkey (which
do not participate in Turkish elections), and in Iran, the re-
siduum of which is based in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq—
usually restrained by tacit diplomatic agreements between the
KRG and Iran. And in all four of the wolves, microparties
proclaim their adherence to a Greater Kurdistan, hoping that
one day Kurds will rally to their organization.
Sentiment for a Greater Kurdistan is manifest in all four
parts of historic Kurdistan and in the Kurdish diaspora. Flags,
banners, maps, songs, poetry, novels, broadcasting, and ﬁlm
advertise this identiﬁcation. The sentiment crosses the
Kurmanji-Sorani difference in dialect and religious differ-
ences among Kurds—Sunni, Shiite, Alevi, Yazidi, Christian,
Sabean-Mandean, Shabak, Kakai’s, and secular. It is manifest
in the Kurdish names of the Lesser Kurdistans: Rojava Kur-
distanê (where the sun sets) is western Kurdistan (northern
Syria); Bakurê Kurdistanê is northern Kurdistan (southeast
Turkey); Başûrê Kurdistanê (southern) Kurdistan is the Kur-
distan Region of Iraq; and Rojhilatê Kurdistanê (where the sun
rises) is eastern Kurdistan (the northwestern border region of
Iran).13 Across the four polities that repress them or try to
contain them, Kurds read and listen to each other’s media,
legal or otherwise, and watch one another’s political spaces.
As all the authors document, at particular junctures Kurds
are inspired across pan-Kurdish space by particular leaders,
movements, and their strategies. The leadership of the gen-
eral cause has been disputed, but from 1961 until 1975 it was
deﬁnitely held byMulla Mustafa Barzani’s KDP (Orhan, 42).
During the Iranian revolution, Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou
of the KDP of Iran had a brief moment of glory.14 From 1984
until 1996 Abdullah Öcalan’s PKK captured the longings
of Kurds in many places, but after 2003 and until 2013 the
vanguard role returned to the KDP under the leadership of
Mas’udBarzani, his nephewNechirvan, his sonMasrour, and
the late Sami Abdul-Rahman. The PUK, under the leader-
ship of Jalal Talabani, Kosrat Rasoul, FuadMasoum, and Bar-
hamSalih, has shared this limelight—until the party suffered a
major split in 2009, with the formation ofGorran (“Change”).
Today the PKK’s Syrian branch, the PYD, co-led by Salih
Muslim, ﬁlls the spotlight, especially among the Kurdish di-
aspora. Gunter asks whether the Kurds of Syria will pursue
either the PKK or the KRG model (Gunter 2016, chaps. 5
and 6). This is the pertinent question, which we might gloss
as the choice between permanent revolution (PKK) or exper-
imenting with federalism or confederalism (the KRG), while
maintaining the option of secession.
The general point is that pan-Kurdish sentiment provides
both resources and constraints for Kurdish parties and orga-
nizations. Allies, funds, sanctuaries, and strategic ideas are
the obvious resources; the constraints are usually double-
edged. Pan-Kurdish sentiment conditions and increases the
suspicions of their Turkish, Iranian, and Arab neighbors.
However, the pursuit of Kurdish collective or party interests
within each of the Lesser Kurdistans sometimes takes place
at the expense of other Kurds, posing normative constraints
and unpalatable choices. During the Iran-Iraq War both the
KDP and the PUK, to keep Iranian bases and support, at
different times helped Khomeini to defeat the KDP of Iran,
which had the active support of Baathist Iraq—on the prin-
ciple thatmy enemy’s enemy ismy ally (Aziz, 77).15 Similarly,
the PKK’s Öcalan supported the Syrian Baathist regime’s
claim that most of the Kurds in Syria were refugees and mi-
grants fromTurkey, whowould beneﬁt from returning home
(Allsopp, 40). In return for this betrayal of the rights of those
Kurds who had been stripped of their citizenship, the Baath
12. Its policy is to promote a peaceful and democratic resolution of
the Kurdish question in Turkey.
13. Herêmî/Herêm are regional/region, respectively.
14. He was later assassinated by Iranian agents in Vienna; his life and
death are the subject of Prunhuber (2009).
15. In these murky years, the PUK shifted from being allies of the
KDP-I and of Baghdad, back into being an Iranian ally. The party leaders’
conduct makes most sense when read as an attempt to displace the KDP
from being the principal Kurdish player within Iraqi Kurdistan.
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regime gaveÖcalan a free hand to recruit SyrianKurds to ﬁght
for the PKK in Turkey. And in its latest renewal of war on the
governmentof Turkey, thePKKhascutoil andgaspipelines—
including new ones—that run from within the Kurdistan Re-
gion of Iraq and Kirkuk to Turkish reﬁneries and ports. That
it vehemently denies it has done so demonstrates the norma-
tive constraint. The fact that it is willing to cut the lifelines of
the independent energy policy of the KRG—in order to dam-
age Turkey—speaks volumes for its party-centered ruthless-
ness. These stories reﬂect the deep structure of the Kurds’s
collective predicament, namely, that other Kurds are often the
collateral damage of Kurdish party interests. In September
2014, President Barzani told the best English-language news-
paper in the Kurdistan Region that “the defense of the land
and the people of Kurdistan is the duty of all of us and would
override all other duties.”16 Making his statement at the height
of ISIS’s expansion, he was calling for a pan-Kurdish front: no
Kurdish leader could stand idly by and see the PYD extermi-
nated by ISIS and, more important, Kurdish civilians massa-
credor enslaved. But such statements,moments, and follow-up
actions are abnormal. The norm is interparty competition and
distinct politics within each of the four zones of Kurdistan.
Nevertheless, both the great and the neighboring powers
fear a Greater Kurdistan, real or imagined, and sometimes act
accordingly. Until the Justice and Development Party, Adalet
ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), government in Turkey consoli-
dated its detente with the KRG in 2007—and went on to estab-
lish a consulate in Erbil in 2011—Turkish governments had
generally refused to recognize, aid, or exploit Kurdish organi-
zations or autonomy settlements.17 The US State Department
and its EU counterparts, prioritizing their NATO alliance with
Turkey, usually have deferred to Turkey’s fears. But these
seemed to recede under the successive premierships of Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan (2002–11). Under politicians driven by po-
litical Islam rather than Kemalist nationalism, Turkey started
to accommodate Kurds. The AKP won votes among socially
conservative Kurds who opposed the PKK, both because of its
Marxist-Leninist provenance and because of its sustained vi-
olence against traditional elites and traditional Kurdish cul-
ture.18 The AKP government lifted the most egregious bans
on Kurdish culture and language and seemed intent on
distinguishing good Kurds from bad ones. The good publicly
came to include the KDP-led Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
Erdoğan jointly opened his government’s consulate with
PresidentBarzani—dressed for theoccasion inhisPeshmerga
uniform. Turkey has been the principal source of foreign and
direct investment in the KRG—business had long preceded
the Turkish foreign ministry. The bad Kurds were the PKK
and its subunits; although, remarkably, the AKP government
was prepared tonegotiatewith thePKK.19The question ahead
is whether Syrian developments have retriggered Turkey’s
neuralgic anxieties and returned Ankara’s ministries to the pre-
viously implacable postures of Kemal Ataturk. Alternatively
put, will Turkey’s entente with the KDP in the KRG be a ca-
sualty of the renewal of the war with the PKK? The follow-on
question is whether the United States and the EU will follow
their traditional alignments with Ankara—come what may.
Read together, these books show what can happen when
great powers, and the four wolves, try to manage national,
ethnic, and sectarian conﬂicts within policy silos based on
treating each state separately. The Kurds are not alone in their
predicaments. Spillovers of policy often blowback and ren-
der overall policy incoherent. The United States is Turkey’s
NATO ally; jointly they deﬁne the PKK as a terrorist orga-
nization, and the PKK has indeed practiced terrorism (i.e.,
the deliberate killing of civilians for political purposes), as
Orhan documents. Immediately across the Turkish border
in Syria, however, the United States has actively armed and
fought alongside the Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG; trans-
lated variously as the “People’s Protection Units” or the “Pop-
ular Protection Units” and by Allsopp as the “People’s De-
fense Units”). The United States treats the YPG as an ally
against ISIS—the YPG furnished the heroes and heroines of
the defeat of ISIS in Kobanê, a Kurdish-majority city on the
Syria-Turkey border. But the YPG is the militia of the PYD,
which Allsopp and Gunter leave us in no doubt is one of the
family of organizations set up by the PKK. The PYD, with the
YPG as its armed ﬁst, has sought to establish a political mo-
nopoly in Syrian Kurdistan, behind a banner of “democratic
autonomy,” of which more anon. The PYD has tried to ex-
clude the potential inﬂuence of other Syrian Kurdish parties,
who mostly look to the KDP of Iraq for guidance and sup-
port. Yet both the United States and the KRG ended up sup-
porting the YPG in the battle for Kobanê, and the Turkish
government reluctantly permitted the good Kurds of the KDP
to help the bad Kurds of the YPG defeat ISIS because that is
what the United States wanted, although no doubt it sought
side payments.
The contradictions do not end here. The United States is
an adversary of Iran, notwithstanding recent detente over
nuclear programs under the Obama administration. But in
16. Rûdaw, September 19, 2014. This paper is very close to the KDP
but consistently has some of the best writing and reporting.
17. Turkey has bases within the Kurdistan Region, dating to treaties
with Saddam Hussein, which allow its soldiers to engage in hot pursuit of
the PKK, but the Baghdad government does not recognize them.
18. Its militant feminism simultaneously attracts modernized young
women and loses traditionalist Kurdish support to the AK party. 19. Gunter (2016, 52–57) tracks the stalled peace process until 2014.
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Iraq the two are de facto allies against ISIS, and both came
to the aid of the KRG when it appeared that Erbil might fall
to ISIS. In Syria, by contrast, adversarial relations between
the United States and Iran appear to operate. Iran backs the
incumbent regime, while the United States under Obama
backed “the opposition” (i.e., the largely Sunni opposition
that is not in the Al-Nusra Front or ISIS). But, as Allsopp and
Gunter report, in the summer of 2012 the Syrian regime de-
liberately withdrew from its Kurdish-majority “cantons” of
the northwest, north, and northeast. The policy was to allow
the PYD, including its capable coleader SalihMuslim and the
YPG, to ﬂourish in order to weaken the opposition (which
the United States supported). The US support for the YPG
therefore—unintentionally—aids the Assad regime’s survival
strategy, with the approval of Tehran, and creates major head-
aches with the Turkish government. From one perspective, it
looks as if the Syrian, Iranian, and US governments, lately
joined by the Russians, are backing Kurdish Marxists against
Sunni Islamist Syrians in ISIS. From another angle, the Turks,
joined by the Saudis and the Gulf states, back all Sunni Arabs
in Syria against heterodox Syrian Muslims who have set loose
Kurdish Marxists upon the plains people of northern Syria.
The United States currently resolves these headaches with a
ﬁction: the PYD and the YPG are not the PKK. Policy may try
to make that a future fact; it is not, however, a current fact,
although it may be a noble lie. Encouraging the PYD to dis-
associate itself from the PKK and to pursue federal or con-
federal autonomy within a reconstructed Syria would relax
the contradictions in US policy and perhaps relax the Turkish
government—if that is still possible.
Discerning rationality in the Trump administration’s for-
eign policy toward Syria and Iraq is to pursue a mythical ob-
ject. But emphatic antipathy to Iran is evident, and several US
generals, notably ErnieAudino (2017) and JayGarner (2017),
have been openly arguing that supporting an independent
Kurdistan is in US strategic interests. They observe that the
Kurds are reliably pro-American and anti-ISIS and that ISIS
(and its possible successors) cannot be permanently defeated
in the region without the assistance of Kurds. They insist that
US policy in Iraq has failed: Iran now controls the Shiite-
majority government inBaghdadand, crucially, controls Shiite
militias (Popular Mobilization Forces) that operate out-
side Baghdad’s authority. Continuing support for “one Iraq”
amounts to supporting an Iranian proxy state. The territory
controlled by the KRG represents the last terrain blocking
Iranian preeminence in an arc from Tehran to Baghdad to
Damascus and Beirut. Garner (2017, 24) strikingly describes
the space of a would-be independent Kurdistan: “Our enemy
Iran is to their east; their puppet Iraq is to their south; our
enemy Syria is to their west; and Turkey, a NATO ally, is to
their north, which would give us excellent lines of commu-
nication.” The successful export of Kurdish oil and gas re-
serves, especially the latter, through Turkey would jointly
weaken the latter’s reliance on Russia for energy supplies and
reduce Russian blackmail power over the EU. Such analysis
bolsters the advocates of Kurdistan’s prospective secession
from Iraq, but without Turkish cooperation the logistics of
support for a US base in Kurdistan would be complicated.
KURDS OF SYRIA: OUT OF NOWHERE?
Portraits of the Kurds of Syria, among the least well-known
and studied of the Kurds in the west and the last to engage in
armed rebellion, may be found in Allsopp and Gunter.20 Be-
fore the Syrian civil war began in 2011, Kurds were variously
estimated to constitute between 8% and 15% of Syria’s pre-
war population (i.e., about 1.8 and 3.5 million people). A
ﬁgure of 2 million errs on the side of caution. They speak
Kurmanji, the dialect used by most of their coethnics in Tur-
key and in Dohuk and parts of the Erbil governorate in Iraq.
Most are Sunni Muslims, although there are some Yazidis,
who have suffered genocide and female enslavement at the
hands of ISIS. Historically they have been concentrated in
three discontiguous places in northern Syria, namely,
i) The northeastern corner of Syria, which is be-
coming fully contiguous with the Kurdistan Re-
gion of Iraq as the KDP-Peshmerga recovers full
control of the Sinjar region, is to the west of Mosul.
That generates anxiety among Turks. This area has
been Kurdish majority since ofﬁcial records began
in the last century. The encompassing Syrian gov-
ernorate is called al-Hasaka (formerly Jazira) and
had a pre-civil-war population of over 1.5 million
people. Kurdish and Christian coexistence has gen-
erally been long-standing here.
ii) The Kobanê (Ain al-Arab to Arabs) district is in
the northeast of the Aleppo governorate, in north-
central Syria, and had a population of roughly
200,000 in 2004. Accounts vary on howmany have
ﬂed to Turkey (or the Kurdistan Region of Iraq)
before, during, and after the full battle between
ISIS and the YPG. As many as 100,000 may have
evacuated this area.
iii) The most northerly and western part of Syria, a
mountainous outcrop of the Anatolian plateau, the
Efrîn (Afrīn in Arabic) district, had a population of
about 175,000 in 2004. Ethnographically the Kurds
20. A slightly older but very useful account may be found in Tejel
(2009).
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here are indistinguishable from the Kurds of Tur-
key and unquestionably in their homeland. They
are also closest to what has been the most violent
front in the civil war.
Outside of these three areas, people of Kurdish origin,
many of whom have linguistically assimilated into Arabic,
are found in all the major cities of Syria, especially Damas-
cus, which has had Kurds since Saladin’s time. The military
question, pregnant with unanswered political implications,
is whether the PYD/YPG has the will and capability to link
and hold the three previously discontiguous territories in the
north. Turkey has opposed this vista. To what extent if any
will Turkey be willing to accommodate any kind of second
autonomous Kurdistan being established on its southern
border? The US and the Russian governments have so far
sought to restrain the PYD/YPG and have strong incentives
to deter a Turkish intervention. The PYD denies that it has
a nationalist project and emphasizes that the YPG includes
all minorities—and women—in its ranks. The latter claim is
true, but few outside its ranks believe the former.
Allsopp conﬁrms that Kurds have been in what is now
Syria since Ottoman times, and before, but a signiﬁcant (un-
quantiﬁable) portion descend from refugees from Turkey,
who ﬂed or sought asylum from Kemalist repression in the
1920s and the 1930s or who became economic refugees before
and after World War II. Under Syrian Baathist rule, these
refugees were denied citizenship rights, and this policy of cit-
izenship denial was then extended to many other indigenous
Kurds.WhenAssad theyounger got intomajor trouble in2011,
he granted citizenship to undocumented Kurds, and their de-
scendants, both to bolster his regime and to divide his oppo-
sition, which has played its Kurdish cards less skillfully. The
opposition made no signiﬁcant overtures to the Kurds, for ex-
ample, to recognize Kurdish or to grant territorial autonomy
in one or more cantons or governorates. Instead it promised a
banal formula, equal citizenship in a civic state, exactly what
Kemalist Turkey had promised their refugee forebears.21 Some
of the Syrian Arab opposition would appear to have learned
nothing and forgotten nothing from previous and neighbor-
ing conﬂicts with Kurds.
The Syrian KDPwas founded in 1957 on a platform of cul-
tural rights and democracy for the entire country.22 It strongly
opposed the brief pan-Arabist union of Egypt and Syria.
During the last days of the Sublime Porte, Kurds had mostly
been pro-Ottoman rather than allies of Arab nationalists, al-
though there were exceptions. Under the subsequent French
mandate, Kurds were overrepresented in the security forces:
Paris deliberately used minorities in auxiliaries to crush Arab
nationalists. That is why there were many senior soldiers with
Kurdish backgrounds among Syria’s ﬁrst postcolonial dicta-
tors, even though the last of these, Adib Shishaki, favored an
Arab-Muslim nation-state. It also helps explains the gradual,
and for a while the total, exclusion of Kurds from the Syrian
army and party politics under the Baath: there was no place
for Kurds within Syrian Arabism; the Kurds were either for-
eigners or traitors or both, and linguicide became policy.
Baath plans soon extended to building an “Arab belt,” ex-
pelling Kurds living within 15 kilometers of Syria’s borders
withTurkey and Iraq. The project was never completed, partly
because not enough Arabs could be persuaded to settle. Syr-
ian “Arabization,” although no less malevolent or racist, was
less effective than its Iraqi equivalent under SaddamHussein
(Allsopp, 24–28, 234 n. 3). Elsewhere in Syria Kurds were
eventually allowed to ﬁnd employment in the lower ranks of
the security forces—leading some to become regime loyalists
and to acquire military skills, although no longer at senior
ofﬁcer level. Kurdish units, for example, were used to crush
the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama in early 1982.
Sunni Arabs and Kurds in Syria therefore have antago-
nistic relations, even though both have ties of religion and
joint experience of oppression by the Alawite-dominated
Assad regime. The bulk of the Sunni Arab opposition has not
moved to build bridges with the Kurds, most of whom re-
gard Syrian Sunni Arabs as having added Islamist fanaticism
to their traditional pan-Arab racism. Minimally, Kurds want
clear protections for their cultural rights; maximally, they
want a territorially uniﬁed entity within a federally or con-
federally reconstructed Syria.
Kurdish nationalists not organized in the PKK have long
been disorganized by the Syrian intelligence services and,
not least, by their own lack of unity: the most accurate maxim
of Kurdish politics is that the greatest enemy of the Kurds is
other Kurds. Most of the Syrian Kurdish parties were estab-
lished by notables and treated as their hereditary assets: they
have rarely attracted support across all three enclaves, they have
often relied on tribal and kinship afﬁliations, and they have
been deeply ﬁssiparous. In the 1990s David McDowall listed
no less than 15 political parties in Syria that sought to repre-
sent Kurdish interests (2004, 484); as of March 2014, Allsopp
lists 21. The taxonomizing of these parties and their actions
before spring 2011 are at the heart of Allsopp’s ﬁeld research
(ix–xii, 72–175), which also usefully documents their efforts
to form coalitions, pre- and post-2011.
21. Vali complains that the Iranian opposition to the incumbent theoc-
racy follows a similar policy toward the Kurds of Iran: “Republican . . . de-
mocracy àla France is simply no answer to the political, juridical and cultural
problems sustaining and reproducing the Kurdish question in Iran” (137).
22. In all four zones of Kurdish space, the KDP party family popularized
the slogan “Democracy for [ﬁll in the country], autonomy for Kurdistan.”
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The Syrian Baath and Turkish governments had border
disputes, including over the use of the Euphrates. One was
the ardent opponent of Israel, the other its ally, and the two
states were on opposite sides of Cold War alliances. Partly in
consequence, the elder Assad hosted the PKKwhen its leader
ﬂed Turkey in 1980 and numerous other Kurdish leftist and
nationalist forces from outside Syria. Cooperation between
the Syrian Baath and the PKK ended only in the late 1990s
when the Turks mobilized an army on the Syrian border and
demandedÖcalan’s extradition. Syria withdrew its active sup-
port for the PKK, and Öcalan went into exile, before eventu-
ally being handed over to the Turkish authorities after his
capture in Kenya (with US assistance). When Assad junior
got into trouble, he went back to his father’s ways: letting the
PKK reemerge (in the form of the PYD), intending to deter,
punish, or distract Turkey, especially by creating a fresh front
in the rear of the Syrian opposition. These aims have been
met. Assad has not, however, recognized the autonomy pro-
claimed by the PYD and has likely lost control of those whom
he hoped to make his clients.
The Kurds of Syria have therefore not come from no-
where, but their lineage is fractious and their future highly
uncertain. If the Assad regime emerges victorious from the
civil war, it may co-opt the Kurds with someminimal cultural
and territorial rights because it will have to rebuild its power
largely through a coalition of minorities—Alawites, Druze,
Christians, and Kurds, along with co-opted Sunnis or oppo-
nents of Sunni Islamism. By contrast, if the opposition even-
tually wins, whether the relevant Sunni Arabs wear Islamist
or civic republican masks (or both), expulsion is the Kurds
likeliest fate. A sustained stalemate and negotiated end to the
Syrian civil war may thereby suit the Kurds best—enabling
institutionalization of their gains. To survive, the Kurds of
Syria will need allies, but whom can they trust, and who will
trust them? The PYDhas reversed Öcalan’s previous stance—
whatever the daily changes in verbiage—and now stands for
territorial autonomy for Syrian Kurdistan and equal citizen-
ship rights for Kurds.
Independent reports of the PYD’s rule have not suggested
havens of political pluralism—Kurds from other parties have
been imprisoned—but reliable sources are not plentiful, and
there are no reports of gross abuses of human rights. Gunter
(2014, 122–28) provides a brief discussion of “democratic
autonomy” as espoused by the PYD and inspired by Öcalan.
To any historian this idea reruns the isocratic tradition in
communism—egalitarian and hierarchy-free statelessness,
conciliar participatory democracy, the rule of the people over
experts, and the replacement of bureaucracy by citizens who
practice self-administration. Differently put, it is the recur-
rent anarchic vision of the abolition of the division of labor
in politics. Such self-organizing communities (communes or
soviets) have emerged in many revolutions but rarely last
long, especially in war zones. Stateless self-organization may
especially appeal to Kurds who have no (fully independent)
state of their own, especially those in Turkish jails,23 but
those who are more realistic will seek a state or states of their
own (or within a more conventional conception of a con-
federation). Gunter observes that while Leninist doctrine
promotes the smashing of the state, actual Marxist-Leninist
vanguard parties rarely tolerate other parties when they come
to power and usually move to become dictators. Among the
items for the crowded agenda of any future peace congress
on Syria, therefore, will be not just the protection of Kurds,
Kurdish-speaking Yazidis, and other microminorities but
the multiparty democratization of the Kurdish spaces and a
genuine and veriﬁable decoupling of the PYD’s organization
from that of the PKK. The PYD’s feminism, secularism, and
inclusiveness win some deserved plaudits in the West, but
the ﬁction of no-party government passes no credibility tests.
Any feasible negotiated settlement of Syria will have to
take either a federal or confederal form, based on the Ala-
wite, Druze, and Christian zones of concentration in the east,
the Sunni Arab areas in the south and middle of the country,
and the Kurdish-dominated areas of the north. No such set-
tlement will be viable if it is based on simple majority rule
within a powerful federal government. The Assad regime,
and all the ethnic and religious minorities, will reject such
proposals. Some hope for progress may rest in the disarray of
Turkey’s Syrian policy, which desperately needs constructive
amendment, especially because Russia (and Iran) have suc-
cessfully blocked the defeat of the Assad regime.24 Turkey
had previously allowed all Islamists to cross its borders when
it was resolved to bring about Assad’s demise but has sowed
the wind that produced ISIS. With their ﬁngers burned
through blowback can Turkey’s leaders withdraw from a reck-
less policy and be reengaged on a better platform? The im-
mediate future is likely one of numerous cease-ﬁres, cessations
of hostilities, and their breakdown, but considering con/fed-
eral reconstruction warrants further inspection. Its supreme
23. In the ﬁrst volume of his prison writings, Öcalan sees Sumerian
civilizations as the foundation of all repressive hierarchies, including that of
men over women. Statelessness is the solution, and feminism and dem-
ocratic autonomy the means, to reverse what was built in Mesopotamia
(Öcalan 2007). The genesis of these writings is something of a mystery,
given the author’s imprisonment and the obscure description of the edi-
torial team’s role.
24. The deliberate shooting down of a Russian plane in November 2015
was extraordinarily risky. Turkey has lost most wars it has fought with
Russia since the eighteenth century and had little reason to believe that its
allies would support it, unless it was attacked. This action led manyWestern
governments to question Turkey’s rationality (see Hallinan 2015).
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merit for traditional foreign ofﬁces is that it would preserve
the exterior boundary of the old Syria. But con/federalizing
Syria prompts at least three tricky questions. Can US, Euro-
pean, Russian, Iranian, and Turkish diplomats cooperate with
Syrian Kurds and Arabs? No such settlement could function
without Sunni Arab partners—they are the demographic ma-
jority—but who are they to be, how are they to be organized,
and with what international sponsors?25 A settlement that
conﬁnes the Assad family to western Syria may be possible,
but how will a Bosnia writ-large settlement be implemented
without international peacekeeping forces? Even to raise such
questions seems visionary, but what other kind of settlement
is possible? The answer is twofold: the breakup of Syria or a
renewal of the ﬁght to the ﬁnish to control it, and these are
very close equivalents in their consequences. Differently put,
the answer is more refugees.
GOING SOMEWHERE: THE KRG OR THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH KURDISTAN?
Mahir Aziz demonstrates the existence of a long-standing
Kurdish identity and that there is a powerful constituency for
independence among the best educated Kurds in the KRG,
whom he surveyed in 2007.26 Today their heartfelt prefer-
ence is on the regional and international agenda, placed there
by President Barzani, originally when the federal Iraqi army
collapsed inMosul in the summer of 2014. The referendum is
now scheduled for September 25, 2017, supported by 15 of
the KRG’s 17 parties. Critics accuse Barzani of being engaged
in diversionary politics: the KRG has a major ﬁscal crisis, like
most oil-dependent polities; a domestic constitutional crisis
(the region’s draft constitution has not been ratiﬁed because
of continuing interparty disputes over the respective powers of
the presidency and parliament); and relations between Bagh-
dad and Erbil are poisonous, although still largely peaceful.27
The three-party coalition government in Erbil was reduced to
two when Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani removed the
Gorran party from ofﬁce after some of its key leaders and
cadres organized riots against the KDP. President Barzani’s
term of ofﬁce has expired, so he is effectively a caretaker until
the interparty and constitutional crisis is resolved. (He has
only the thin veneer of a legal opinion without obvious stand-
ing to support his emergency status.)28
Others do not focus on internal KRG politics, however,
and speculate that Barzani wishes to lead the region to inde-
pendence to complete his life’s work before stepping down: he
has committed to not standing again. All such accounts tend
to underplay Baghdad’s sustained violations of the Consti-
tution of Iraq as an explanation of the determination to have a
referendum. Key transitional provisions, especially those af-
fecting the “disputed territories,” have not been implemented;
Iraq has neither a federal second chamber nor the federal
supreme court speciﬁed in the constitution; efforts to create
federal regions from provinces, as permitted by the consti-
tution, have been unlawfully and coercively blocked; the work
of numerous independent public bodies has been either sub-
orned or subverted. Supporters of the referendum insist that
a permanent constitution that is permanently violated can-
not bind anyone and that a voluntary union that was ratiﬁed
by referendum may and will be voluntarily dissolved by ref-
erendum.
The cynical explanations of the drive toward a referendum
also forget theKurds’s reaction to the threat of ISIS.29 After the
Iraqi federal army ﬂed from its positions in Mosul and the
“disputed territories,”Kurdsmade all the territorial gains they
had ever sought, but then the KRG itself was imperiled. The
big lesson was very simple: Kurds could not rely on security
fromBaghdad. Not only were they left in the lurch to face ISIS
in charge of an arsenal originally supplied by theUnited States
to the Iraqi army, but Baghdad insisted on inspecting any
arms sent to the Peshmerga in the midst of ISIS’s major mo-
ment of territorial expansion. The Kurdish leadership deter-
mined that they needed to strengthen the Peshmerga forces,
to refocus on achieving cohesion within their own institu-
tions, and that they needed to break free of Baghdad’s use of
oil-revenue allocations to blackmail them. All Kurds were as-
25. The Syrian opposition’s bargaining power is very limited; Sunni
Arab numbers have been diminished by mass ﬂight, and the Trump ad-
ministration has ended US support for the so-called moderate opposition.
Some among the Sunni opposition who are not Islamists have recognized
that the failure to provide credible commitments to Alawites, Druze, Chris-
tians, and Kurds helped the Assad regime survive.
26. Aziz takes and applies Anthony Smith’s ethnosymbolist approach
to national identity, whereas Vali hews to the more conventional “con-
structivist” approach to nationalism found among social scientists.
27. There have, however, been clashes between the Peshmerga and
Shiite militias.
28. The most acerbic critics of the KRG, and of the KDP and the PUK,
are found among Gorran supporters; a typical example of their rhetoric
may be found in Hassan (2015). Sultanism, derived from Max Weber and
referencing dictatorships, is not the correct political science category for
the dominance of the KDP and the PUK (see Chehabi and Linz 1998). But
the problems of nepotism and corruption within the KRG are genuine,
and some advocate independence precisely to avoid the KRG becoming as
mired in corruption as Arab-majority Iraq.
29. Romano (2014) provides an excellent account that requires one
emendation: the supreme court mandated by the constitution has never
been legislated. What is wrongly described as a supreme court by com-
mentators is the transitional court established under the now superseded
Transitional Administrative Law. Iraq has no validly constituted supreme
court to arbitrate profound constitutional differences; one further example
of its institutional shambles.
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tonished that the Abadi government continued to pay the
salaries of Iraqis in occupied Mosul (“taxed” by ISIS) while re-
fusing to send Erbil its lawful share of Iraq’s budget or to pay
or arm the Peshmerga. In consequence, KDP PrimeMinister
Nechirvan Barzani and his PUK deputy Qubad Talabani have
overseen painful and unpopular austerity and economic re-
form programs. Impending sovereignty has increased the im-
petus for reform. Whatever the driving motivations may be,
the Kurds of Iraq are scheduled to vote to leave Iraq. The ref-
erendum process will be used to incorporate the bulk of the
disputed territories, including most of Kirkuk but not Hawija.
These are the “known” futures that foreign ministries have to
address. It is unknown what they plan to do in response, and
here Turkey’s role and that of the United Stateswill be critical.
Noonecurrentlyexpects theTrumpadministration’s response
to be other than improvised.
The KRG has a profound interest in its entente with Tur-
key, its principal non-oil foreign investor and, so far, the only
reliable outlet for its oil and gas exports. Neither the KDP nor
the PUK have ever supported the PKK—although the PUK
and PKK are closer in founding ethos—and no love is lost
between the three parties at the leadership level. If the KRG
wishes to ease its path to independence, it must avoid all risks
to its relationships with Turkey and work to achieve recog-
nition from it. A successful bid for independence will mean
the renunciation of territorial claims on Turkey, Syria, or Iran;
expressing no vision of a Greater Kurdistan; and offering
credible reassurances about the city government of Kirkuk
(where a signiﬁcant Turkoman minority remains) and con-
solidation of protections to all the microminorities in Kur-
distan.30
Turkey and the KRG Kurds have joint interests beyond
oil and gas pipelines. They need each other to balance against
Shia Islamist dominance in Baghdad and Tehran. Turkey has
acknowledged that it beneﬁts from having a stable and non-
irredentist Kurdish neighbor. Erbil and Ankara have joint
interests in strengthening the non-PYD Kurds in Syria, in
seeing the PYD separate from the PKK, and in managing the
massive ﬂows of refugees from the Syrian civil war. These
shared interests could be components of a joint approach to
achieving a Syrian settlement, with Turkey as the guardian
of the Sunni Arabs and the Turkmen, while the KRG would
be the guardian of the Kurds and some of the Christians and
Yazidis in the north and west. Turkey does not think the
timing of theKRG’s referendum is wise but has so far avoided
saying absolutely “never.” Its approach will be decided by
President Erdoğan, who has been busy for over a year in
crushing an attempted Gulenist coup and governing under
emergency decrees in which extraordinary purges of the pub-
lic sector and repression of internal opposition has occurred,
including of Turkish Kurds.
THE KURDS OF TURKEY: HOW MANY PEACES
CAN A STATE PROCESS?
The ﬁeld research in Orhan’s Political Violence and Kurds in
Turkey could not have been conducted today. Several cities
in Turkey’s Kurdish southeast are said to have been reduced
to rubble, although with a media blackout such reports can-
not be veriﬁed. By contrast, Orhan’s doctoral thesis was su-
pervised in Paris during a hopeful time in Turkish-Kurdish
relations, when theAKP government and the PKKwere in on-
and-off negotiations about negotiations. As late as June 2015,
there was an impressive showing in elections for the Peo-
ple’s Democratic Party, Halkların Demokratik Partisi (HDP),
largely aKurdishparty both in its extensive ties to thePKKand
in its voting base. For the ﬁrst time, it went signiﬁcantly past
the 10% threshold required for winning seats—a threshold
designed by previous Turkish dictators to exclude Kurdish
parties from parliamentary representation. The AKP also lost
its governing majority, and negotiations began over the for-
mation of a coalition government. The otherwise disunited
Turkish opposition parties were determined to prevent the
creation of an executive presidency—Erdoğan’s central re-
maining constitutional ambition.
On July 20, 2015, however, an ISIS suicide bomber, a Turk-
ish national who may have been of Kurdish origin, killed
more than 30 people at a Kurdish political gathering held in
favor of the Kurds of Syria in Suruc, near the Syrian border.
Claiming that the “deep state” had a role in the bombing, the
PKK responded by killing two policemen in the town of Cey-
lanpinar. There was no convincing proof of governmental in-
volvement in the bombing; indeed, the PKK’s decision was
worse than a crime, it was a blunder (unless one assumes, as
some Kurds half-jokingly say, that the PKK is run by Turkish
intelligence). In August Erdoğan brought the coalition nego-
tiations toanabrupt endandcalleda snapelection to takeplace
on November 1, after a summer in which over 100 Turkish
security ofﬁcials, far more PKK militants, and an unknown
number of civilians were killed. In October ISIS attacked again
in Ankara: two suicide bombers, one Turkish the other Syr-
ian, killed over 100 people at a pro-peace rally.
The PKK, by taking the bait, had given Erdoğan what he
had needed to restore his party’s electoral dominance. The
wave of violent instability pushed frightened Turkish vot-
ers back toward a single-party government. The AKP won a
mandate to govern until 2019 and was subsequently able to
exploit the defeat of the Gulenist coup to push through en-
30. On Kirkuk, see Anderson (2013) and Anderson and Stansﬁeld
(2009).
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hancements of presidential executive power and other major
constitutional amendments in April 2017. The HDP’s vote
fell in 2016, although it just scraped over the 10% threshold.
Along with the other opposition, it has so far been unable to
block Erdoğan’s reconstruction of Turkey.
Readers of Orhan’s book will learn that the PKK has often
shown strategic ineptitude, if assessed from the perspective
of Kurdish collective interests. Its insurgency, from 1984 un-
til the late 1990s, led to the mass destruction and forced evac-
uation of thousands of Kurdish villages, although the Turkish
authorities are responsible for these gross human rights viola-
tions. The PKK’s latest decision to return to war similarly dis-
played scant regard for collateral damage to Kurdish civilians,
let alone Turks, and it has jeopardized the political projects of
the Kurds of Syria, Iraq, and Turkey. The master key to
explaining the PKK’s actions, if my reading of Orhan’s work
is correct, is its continuous insistence on being the monop-
olist of Kurdish interests wherever it organizes. The party
emerged from a bloodywar of attrition amongmicroparties on
the Turkish and Kurdish Left between the late 1970s and early
1980s—in which every local cleavage, tribal, sectarian, gener-
ational, and linguistic was exploited with scant regard for
political principle. Recently the PKK has seemed to fear both
that the HDP would slip out of its sphere of inﬂuence and
make a settlement with the AKP and that urban Kurdish youth
(often the children of those expelled from their villages by the
Turkish army) would go it alone. In short, the PKK may have
gone back to war not in a tit-for-tat attack on the deep state, or
to aid the PYD by opening another front, but rather to try to
resecure its monopoly, hoping later to be invited to the ne-
gotiating table as the sole representative of Kurdish interests.
In its zealous eradication of rivals within its own ethnic group,
in its militarist feminism, in its use of suicide bombers, in its
cultlike qualities, and even perhaps in its overestimation of its
military capabilities, the PKK bears an astonishing resemblance
to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE).31 Time will tell
whether it will face a similar demise.32 Whether the PKK can
be bludgeoned into renewing its cease-ﬁre or persuaded into
sharing politics with other Kurds perhaps remains an open
question. Its past performance is not promising.
Orhan’s account has many valuable vignettes of violence,
but it is not for the faint-hearted, not just because of the grizzly
tales therein but because it is a stylistic mess—he personally
translated his political sociology thesis written in French. Rout-
ledge should have supplied much greater editorial assistance.
As readers of this review may have already experienced, try-
ing to navigate a forest of acronyms of Kurdish organizations
that resemble the parties satirized in Monty Python’s Life of
Brian is hard enough. But when the author uses Foucault,
Bourdieu, and the usual suspects for guides while moving be-
tween two languages that are not his mother tongue, the prose
is sometimes excruciating. Even the book’s title misleads—
one expects an account of the violence of the Turkish state
against Kurds as well as of violence against the state and oth-
ers by Kurdish rebels. In any such treatment, the government
would be judged the killer of the greater number. Orhan, how-
ever, shares much with recent US students of civil wars, who
are often more interested in inﬁghting among rebel organi-
zations, and their use and abuse of their civilian constituents,
than they are in the contest between the state and rebels. This
focus on intra-rebel and intra-ethnic violence is sometimes
morally salutary but often skates over deep methodological
problems, especially the bias in media reports and ofﬁcial
sources, which usually tilt toward governments rather than
rebels. This type of focus sometimes occludes the big picture.
The PKK is both a major cause of conﬂict and, as currently
constituted, a major roadblock to the democratic reconstruc-
tion of Turkey and its neighbors. But its existence and its na-
ture are also the results of decades of Turkish repression.
LESSONS FROM MAHABAD IN IRAN?
Iran will be a decisive player in what unfolds for Kurds and
Kurdistan(s), even if its own Kurds remain quiescent in the
decade ahead.Whereas the Erdoğan administration has some-
times signaled that it may accommodate an independent
Kurdish state emerging from the KRG, Iran has never given
any equivalent notice. Tehran’s counsel will be given to the
Shia-dominated rump regime in Baghdad, which is asking
itself whether it should recognize an independent Kurdistan;
accept a confederal reconstruction of Iraqi space; or refuse
recognition, starve theKRGof its budgetary entitlements, and
even ﬁght to keep the Kurds within Iraq? Prime Minister
Abadi has ruled out the latter option; whether the Shiite mi-
litias will follow this injunction remains to be seen.
Safavid Iran like Ottoman Turkey used Kurds as buffers.
Old diplomatic hands expect KDP Kurds, strongest in Dohuk
and Erbil, to be pitted against PUK/Gorran Kurds, strongest
in Sulaimania and in Kirkuk. In time-honored fashion, they
expect that each party faction will become a client of its most
proximate neighbor: the axis of conﬂict would be the gov-
ernment of Iran and PUK (and Gorran) versus the KDP and
the government of Turkey, with the rival intelligence ser-
vices supporting the two different faces of the PKK/PJAK.
31. For PKK and LTTE comparisons, see Ergil (2007) and O’Duffy
(2007).
32. There is at least one major difference in the trajectories of the PKK
and the LTTE: Öcalan is alive in a Turkish prison and formally has aban-
doned a Greater Kurdistan, a federal region for Kurds within Turkey, and,
nominally at least, seeking any kind of state (Öcalan 2007, 296–97).
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This scenario can be avoided, but a great deal will depend on
whether and how Kurds settle their current internal disputes
within what may become the future Republic of South Kur-
distan. Successful power sharing within and among Duhok,
Erbil, Sulaimania, and Kirkuk is essential for a viable bid for
independence to succeed.
Iran withstood and welcomed the American removal of
Saddam Hussein, but after Iranian overtures to the Bush ad-
ministration were rejected,33 Iran’s intelligence services de-
termined to make Iraq ungovernable during the US occupa-
tion and to consolidate Shia power in Baghdad. These aims
have largely been secured, although they were unsettled by the
eruption of ISIS. The question now is whether Iran wishes to
keep western Iraq and eastern Syria in permanent war, feeding
its tribes and militias with money and weapons, or will it cash
in its chips? The latter policy would avoid a complete loss in
Syria but leave it without a signiﬁcant Sunni Arab power on its
western ﬂank. For Iran that may be a price worth settling for.
Iran could coexist with known Kurdish quantities in the
KRG with whom the regime has long historic and personal
ties. But independent Kurdish polities have had extinction
experiences at the hands of Iranian regimes (including in Sa-
favid times). The most recent occasion was in 1946 when
Kurds declared an independent republic in northwest Iran.
The Mahabad Republic was the Kurds ﬁrst experience of
self-rule in modern times. Although short-lived, the republic
had a formative inﬂuence on subsequent Kurdish national-
ist movements: it was here, for example, that Mulla Mustafa
Barzani cut his teeth as a general. In his generally very clear
book, Vali disputes the established view that the Republic
was the result of a Soviet conspiracy to dismember Iran or a
mere side effect of the maneuvers between the three major
victors of World War II—the British, the Americans, and the
Soviets. He suggests that internal Iranian, Azeri, and Kurdish
developments led to the Republic, and he provides a well-
documented account of internal Kurdish differences (partic-
ularly urban-rural and tribal-nontribal cleavages). Vali argues
that the republic’s formation was the culmination of the de-
velopment of a new Kurdish national identity within Iran,
one that had emerged in response to the exclusionary politics
of the centralizing polity Iran had become, that is, a reaction
to coercive “Persianization” and (Twelver) “Shi’aﬁcation.”
Here one may quibble with the author, however. The Kurd-
ish identity was already in being, as Aziz would say. What
was novel was its diffusion across both urban and rural classes
and its democratization.
Vali has mastery of Persian and Kurdish and has ac-
cessed and deployed the primary sources in these languages,
but he does not appear to have explored Azeri or Russian
archival sources and appears to have used second-hand Amer-
ican archival sources through a seminar paper. He is less clear
when he uses the idioms of poststructuralism—like many po-
litical theorists he appears to hold the disabling belief that
facts are both relative and right wing. These epistemic beliefs
inhibit him frommaking strong claims to have established the
truth as to what transpired in the making and the breaking of
the Mahabad Republic. The Mahabad Republic was destroyed
after the Soviet withdrawal, and its captured leaders were hung
as traitors. “Kurdish identity, language and culture were sup-
pressed with unprecedented force and vehemence,” writes
Vali (136). He argues that naiveté about liberal democratic
constitutionalism is among the lessons to be learned by the
successors of Mahabad. Other pertinent lessons are that small
polities can be crushed after the withdrawal of a great power
from a world region, especially internally divided small polities
without uniﬁed security forces.
DOES HECHTER’S LATEST EVOLUTION
IN HIS WORLDVIEW HELP?
In The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq, Khaled Salih and I argued
that one way to explain the development of Kurdish nation-
alism in Iraq was through Michael Hechter’s emphasis on
the repercussions of the switch from indirect rule in premod-
ern states to direct rule under modern states (see O’Leary and
Salih 2005), a perspective usefully compatible with Ernest
Gellner’s account of the differences between the agro-literate
polity and the modern nation-state (O’Leary 1998). In Alien
Rule, the subtleties and scope of which cannot be treated here,
Hechter provides a one-chapter account of what became Iraq
from late Ottoman times until today. He is highly reliant on
Charles Tripp’s (2007) History of Iraq, in which Kurdistan
is largely a sideshow, but has no difﬁculty in showing that
increased state penetration over the last century deeply dis-
turbed previous intergroup relations between Shiites, Sunnis,
and Kurds or in showing that their collective predicaments
were subsequently exacerbated by the fact that no subsequent
post-Ottoman regime—British, Hashemite, republican, Baath-
ist, American, or Shia led—was credibly able to provide state
services impartially across ethnic and sectarian groups to de-
liver both legitimacy and effectiveness. It is not clear, however,
that any regime in Iraq genuinely attempted to pursue such
an ideal.
Like Gellner, Hechter believes that inmodern times “alien
rule” is intrinsically difﬁcult, but unlike Gellner, Hechter
thinks it is sociologically possible. Hechter recognizes that
both of the British occupations (of the 1920s and the 1940s)
and the US-led occupation (of 2003–11) of Iraq were neither33. See the fascinating account in Parsi (2007, appendixes, 341ff.).
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planned nor run to ensure impartiality. Yet he seems to hold
a strong residual conviction that impartial alien rule was
possible. Tellingly, regional geopolitics plays little role in his
discussion of the historiography, and equally tellingly, he ac-
cepts that successful neo-trusteeship would have been very
expensive and would have had to last longer, and he knows
that the United States had few incentives to follow such a
project. In one line Hechter dismisses as “mistaken” Gal-
braith’s (2006) argument that a proper multinational federa-
tion should have been encouraged by the Coalition Provisional
Authority (74). It is, however, Hechter who is mistaken. He
reports not a single case of successful international trusteeship
in the postcolonial world that has established, or reestablished,
a centralized state that treats each major national or ethnic
group fairly unless it is accompanied by multinational federal
or consociational institutions (which he does not discuss).
Hechter misapplies a deep insight, namely, the contrast be-
tween indirect rule in agraria and direct rule in industria. He
is correct to argue that there is a place for arbitration (decision-
making roles for external third parties, persons, and institu-
tions) in the regulation and perhaps the resolution of national
and ethnic conﬂicts and to observe that alien rule was more
pervasive in the past and that it has not disappeared in the
present, but he errs in missing multinational and consocia-
tional forms of government from his overly large canvas. He
misses them because his conception of alien rule is too capa-
cious. If my nation is a member of a multinational federa-
tion, proportionally present in its representative institutions,
with full parity of status, am I being ruled by aliens, or am
I sharing rule with partners? The answer can sometimes be
the latter. Likewise, in a consociation jointness is the key
norm.34
Either constructive Syrian and Iraqi futures and the fu-
ture of their respective Kurds will be highly confederal, or the
formation of new nation-states will be inevitable; Iraq hovers
close to the threshold of survival. The grimmer scenario of
the continuing destruction of the contending parties is not to
be precluded. But any fresh bouts of alien rule in Kurdish
lands in Iraq or Syria will be either acts of conquest (under
Turkish, Iranian, or Arab invasions) or brief and function-
ally speciﬁc (e.g., the UN ﬁeld organizations). It is impossible
to imagine an international trusteeship that would be able
to meet Hechter’s standards of service provision over either
Syria or Iraq. By contrast, Turkey and Iran will have to ac-
commodate “their Kurds” as Kurds or else resolve to pur-
sue roughly another century of coercive assimilation (another
form of alien rule) with all of its most likely consequences.
Regrettably, the theses of Alien Rule may be abused in favor
of paternalistic neo-trusteeships or to license support for
future (nonconsensual) recentralization projects that are ex-
ceptionally unlikely to deliver the model of a just, impartial,
and integrated civic state. But Hechter should be read: he is
terse and never dull.
CONCLUSION
Robert W. Olson recently compared the prospects of cur-
rent Kurdish nationalism with those of Jewish nationalism
from the 1880s until 1948.Weak Arab polities under colonial
rule from 1917 until 1948, he argued, facilitated the Zionists’
ambitions. By contrast, the predicament of the Iraqi Kurds
after 1992 was “quite different and more challenging. . . .
Turkey, Iran and Syria are larger, more populous and more
powerful than the Lebanon, Jordan and Syria of the 1920s
and 1930s.” The United States has favorable relations with
some states surrounding the Kurds of Iraq, such as Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait, “but it has less inﬂuence over Iran or
Syria and limited inﬂuence with Turkey. It seems unlikely
that US support for the Kurds of Iraq and for Kurdish na-
tionalism in Iran, Turkey and Syria will be as enduring as
Britain’s support for Zionism” (Olson 2010, 27–28).
It was an instructive comparison, but since it was written
both Syria and Iraq have entered prolonged civil wars. We
await what follows. The Kurds, the world’s largest nation
without a sovereign state, and the fourth largest nation in
the Middle East, currently have two de facto states: the one
in Iraq being more institutionalized than that in Syria. We
will see whether these Kurdish polities severally or jointly
have the power to refuse “to return to the old formula of ad
hoc co-option and intimidation by the center” (Tripp 2007,
321). Those who watch Kurds in Western foreign ofﬁces
may consider a paraphrase from an old poem: “Thou shalt
not kill states, but needst not strive ofﬁciously to keep them
alive.”35 Or, they may choose to stand idly by and allow a
strange parallel “victory”: an Iranian (and Russian) victory
that keeps the Assad regime in power and an Iranian (and
American) victory that keeps the Baghdad Shia in power.
Should this scenario emerge, it would be hailed as the de-
feat of ISIS, but it would be at the expense of the Kurds (and
Sunni Arabs). If so, a general rebalancing against Iran may
then become the next order of business. The fate of the Kurds
therefore remains within the maw of the great powers and
of the two most powerful wolves, Turkey and Iran. Iran’s
scarcely disguised aspiration to run the two lamed wolves,
34. For a cautious defense of consociation, see O’Leary (2005), and of
multinational federations, see McGarry and O’Leary (2009).
35. To adapt Clough’s “The Latest Decalogue.” See Clough (1968, 60–
61).
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Iraq and Syria, as client states looks like imperial overreach.
We can, however, be sure of onematter: the deﬁnitive history
of Kurdish nationalism must be postponed until Kurds have
at least one recognized state—one of their own or within an
as yet unmade confederation.
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